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Every state in the United States of America has a complex web of laws 
protecting at least some animals from cruelty and neglect. Although many 
advocates agree that these laws do not afford legal rights to animals, as “rights” are 
defined under American Law, they do provide the principal (and in some cases 
only) legal protection available to animals in this country. Depending on the 
severity of the crime and other factors, state law may consider animal cruelty an 
infraction, a misdemeanor, or a felony.1 Most often, the conduct encompassed by 
anti-cruelty laws is classified as a lower level misdemeanor offense; however, as of 
today, forty-six states and the District of Columbia have at least one felony anti-
cruelty law.  Only four states—Idaho, Mississippi North Dakota and South 
Dakota—currently have no felony-level anti-cruelty law.  
Of more interest, however, is the fact that America’s first anti-cruelty law 
                                            
1 Infractions, misdemeanors and felonies provide varying levels of penalties, with infractions providing the 
lowest level penalty (usually a small fine with no jail time or other penalties) and felonies imposing the highest level 
of penalty (oftentimes a substantial fine, one or more years in prison, community service, restitution and/or other 
penalties as the court deems appropriate). 
was enacted over three hundred years ago (by the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 
1641), followed by the first state anti-cruelty law in 1804, but that thirty-nine 
(more than eighty percent) of the existing felony anti-cruelty laws were only 
passed in the last fifteen years. This heightened legislative activity in the 1990s and 
first decade of this century suggests a pronounced fundamental, and very recent, 
change in the level of interest and willingness of states to address more vigorously 
animal abuse and neglect through the legislative process.  
 One theory many scholars point to as forming the basis for this recent 
interest and activity in anti-cruelty laws is the plethora of scientific studies 
demonstrating that a direct link exists between animal abuse and other forms of 
human violence. Over the past several years, a near constant stream of newspaper 
and magazine articles has presented this information to the public,2 causing (or 
maybe responding to) an increased interest in animal abuse issues in communities 
across the country. 
Even before credible scientific research findings on the subject became 
generally available, the link between animal abuse and human violence made 
intuitive sense to most people. In 1751, the English artist William Hogarth printed 
                                            
2 See, e.g., Deirdre Connor, If Done to Animals, Are People Next? Why Animal Abuse Begins and Where it Ends, 
Florida Times-Union, Feb. 16, 2009, at A-1; Jack Leonard, Officials Sic Prosecutors on Animal Abusers, Virginian-
Pilot, Feb. 14, 2009, at Q2; Editorial Pages Desk, Cruelty Link: The Killers Who Abused Animals, L.A. Times, Feb. 
11, 2009, at A-22; Michelle Lore, Attorneys Suggest Asking Judge in Minnesota to Extend Protection to Household 
Pets, Minnesota Lawyer, Jan. 19, 2009, at News section; Phil Arkow, National Expert Warns of Abuse Link: Law 
Enforcement Can Use Animal, Human Connection as Tool, He Says, The Record (Stockton), Jan. 3, 2009, at 
Opinion; Don Stacom, Judge Highlights Legal Tool Against Animal Cruelty; MandatoryCounseling, San Bernardino 
County Sun, Jan. 3, 2009, at A14. 
a series of four engravings, entitled “The Four Stages of Cruelty.” The engravings 
follow the criminal path of “Tom Nero”, starting with his torture of a dog in the 
first engraving, theft and murder in the next two engravings, and ending with a 
final engraving (entitled “The Reward of Cruelty”) that depicts Tom as a corpse 
being publicly dissected, having been convicted and hung for his crimes. The 
engravings simply illustrate in graphic fashion what we now recognize as a tragic, 
yet common, social “link” phenomenon.  Dramatic modern day examples of this 
phenomenon focus on the more infamous serial killers of the past 20 years.  
Without exception, every serial killer in United States history has been shown to 
have a history of violence against animals.  
Yet today, our knowledge of this phenomenon has more than anecdotal or 
intuitive bases. Sociologists, criminologists, psychologists and other scholars and 
practitioners have studied and documented the link, and there are now numerous 
peer-reviewed studies3 exploring the “link” and its various permutations. 
The first well-documented evidence of the link resulted from a study of 
eighty-four prison inmates. The study, conducted in the 1960s, found that seventy-
five percent of those charged with violent crimes had early records of cruelty to 
                                            
3 A number of these studies can be found in: Cruelty to Animals and Interpersonal Violence: Readings in 
Research and Application (Randall Lockwood & Frank R. Ascione eds., 1998); International Handbook of Animal 
Abuse and Cruelty: Theory, Research, and Application (Frank R. Ascione ed., 2008); and also at the following 
websites: Humane Society of the United States, http://www.hsus.org; 
Humane Research Council, http://www.humanespot.org; American Humane, 
http://www.americanhumane.org; The Latham Foundation, http://www.latham.org. 
animals.4 Twenty years later, another study found that twenty-five percent of 152 
aggressive inmates had committed five or more acts of animal cruelty as children, 
compared to only six percent of the nonaggressive inmates.5 In a second study, the 
same researchers interviewed criminals one-on-one to obtain historical descriptions 
of violent acts against animals. The results provided further support for their 
conclusion that childhood cruelty to animals is associated with later aggressive 
behaviors against people.6 A 1988 study of serial sex killers (and the largest such 
study to date) found that thirty-six percent admitted to committing animal cruelty 
as children, forty-six percent admitted to committing animal cruelty as adolescents, 
and thirty-six percent admitted to committing animal cruelty as adults.7  
There is also a high correlation between family violence and animal cruelty. 
A study in 1983 of New Jersey families referred to youth and family services for 
reasons of child abuse reported that sixty percent of the cases had at least one 
member of the household who physically abused nonhumans.  Notably, it was 
sometimes the child acting out on the abuse that s/he had suffered. 8 A study in 
England resulted in similar findings: eighty-three percent of families reported for 
animal abuse had also been identified as at-risk families for child abuse and other 
                                            
4 Daniel Hellman & Nathan Blackman, Enuresis, Firesetting and Cruelty to Animals: A Triad Predictive of 
Adult Crime, 122 Am. J. Psychiatry 1431 (1966). 
5 Alan R. Felthous & Stephen R. Kellert, Childhood Cruelty Toward Animals Among Criminals and 
Noncriminals, 38 Hum. Rel. §12 (1985). 
6 Alan R. Felthous & Stephen R. Kellert, Violence Against Animals and People: Is Aggression Against Living 
Creatures Generalized?, 14 Bull. Am. Acad. Psychiatry Law 55 (1986). 
7 Ressler et al., Sexual Homicides: Patterns and Motives (Massachusetts, Lexington Books 1988).  
8 DeViney et al., The Care of Pets Within Child Abusing Families, 4 Int’l J. Stud. Animal Probs 321 (1983). 
violations by social service agencies.9 The professional journal Social Work printed 
a manual for therapists designed to predict potential violent behavior from patients 
that, not surprisingly, includes animal cruelty as a “factor highly associated with 
violent, antisocial behavior.”10 And in 1997, a study by the Massachusetts Society 
for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals and Northeastern University found that 
seventy percent of people who committed violent crimes against animals also had 
criminal records for violent, property, drug, or disorderly conduct crimes.11 This 
finding was further supported in a more recent study, conducted by the Chicago 
Police Department, that examined 322 animal cruelty arrests and discovered that 
seventy percent of those arrested had other felony charges (including homicides), 
eighty-six percent had multiple arrests, seventy percent had narcotics charges, 
sixty-five percent had been charged with violent offenses, twenty-seven percent 
had previous firearms charges, thirteen percent had been arrested on sex crime 
charges, and fifty-nine percent were alleged gang members.12 
In demonstrating the syndrome of abuse, however, the 1997 study found that 
fifty-six percent of animal abusers who committed other crimes, committed those 
crimes prior to the animal offense. This finding is interesting because it does not 
                                            
9 James S. Hutton, Animal Abuse as a Diagnostic Approach in Social Work: A Pilot Study, in Cruelty to 
Animals and Interpersonal Violence: Readings in Research and Application 417 (Randall Lockwood and Frank R. 
Ascione eds., 1998). 
10 Barbara Star, Patient Violence/Therapist Safety, 29 Soc. Work 25 (1984). 
11 Carter Luke et al., Cruelty to Animals and Other Crimes: A Study by the MSPCA and Northeastern 
University (1997). 
12 Chicago Police Department Statistical Summary of Offenders Charged with Crimes against Companion 
Animals, July 2001–July 2004, Chicago Police Department (Illinois 2008). 
support the previously generally accepted premise that violent individuals start by 
abusing animals and then graduate to human victims. Seen in this context, animal 
abuse is not so much the “canary in the coalmine” as it is part of an overall scheme 
of anti-social, community-based violence. 
More recently, the Chicago Police Department studied 322 animal cruelty 
arrests and discovered that seventy percent of those arrested had other felony 
charges, including homicides; eighty-six percent had multiple arrests; seventy 
percent had narcotics charges; sixty-five percent had been charged with violent 
offenses; twenty-seven percent had previous firearms charges; thirteen percent had 
been arrested on sex crime charges; and fifty-nine percent were alleged gang 
members.13  
As we learn more about this link, a number of other practical and public 
policy considerations also take on renewed prominence, such as the problem that 
abused women have when trying to decide if, when, and how to leave their 
abusers. Research has demonstrated that oftentimes these women have companion 
animals who are not welcome at domestic violence shelters, but who face possible 
abuse if left behind. One recent study found that almost half of pet-owning battered 
women reported real or threatened animal abuse by their partner, and over one-quarter 
reported that concern for their pets affected their decision to leave or stay with the 
                                            
 
batterer.14 Another study similarly found that vast majorities of the women residing at 
domestic violence shelters were distraught about abuse experienced by family pets, and 
that a substantial minority delayed seeking shelter because of concerns for their pet’s 
welfare.15 When a woman in that situation either delays or simply refuses temporary 
shelter out of concern for her pets, she leaves herself, her pets, and possibly her 
children, in an environment where further abuse is likely to occur. In response to this 
problem, many communities have established programs that provide a safe, confidential 
home for the pet while the woman is in residence at a domestic violence shelter.16  
The net result of this research—and its dissemination to the public—is a 
heightened understanding of the importance of combating violent crime wherever 
it occurs, and against whomever it occurs. State and federal law enforcement now 
routinely examine whether animal cruelty was involved in other violent criminal 
activity, as this information provides important clues to identifying the wrongdoer, 
and can provide prosecutors with additional options for criminal charging, plea-
bargaining, and sentencing recommendations. 
Taking animal cruelty seriously as a community crime is also consistent with 
the original philosophical beliefs behind the first American anti-cruelty laws. The 
first laws did not focus primarily on the fact that reducing animal cruelty would 
                                            
14 Catherine A. Faver & Elizabeth B. Strand, To Leave or To Stay?: Battered Women’s Concern for 
Vulnerable Pets, 18 J. Interpers. Violence1367 (2003). 
15 Frank R. Ascione et al., Battered Pets and Domestic Violence: Animal Abuse Reported by Women 
Experiencing Intimate Violence and by Nonabused Women, 13 Violence Against Women 354 (2007) 
16 For examples of both on-site and off-site shelter programs, see American Humane Website, Pets and 
Women’s Shelters (PAWS) Program, http://www.americanhumane.org/human-animal-bond/programs/pets-and-
womens-shelters/. 
reduce animal suffering. Rather, we reasoned that animals should be treated 
humanely both as an expression of our own compassion and to avoid the 
corrupting impact violence and cruelty have on human morals. The resulting 
decline in animal suffering was a nice benefit, but it was certainly not the principal 
driving force behind the laws as originally conceived. Today, discussions about 
animal anti-cruelty laws place more emphasis on the goal of reducing animal 
suffering, but protecting man’s heart from hardening continues to play a significant 
role in the legislative process. 
Turning these philosophical beliefs into a consistent legislative scheme, 
however, has proven to be an elusive task. Under American law, animals are 
property, and this fact can have a profound impact on how the law treats a given 
animal, depending on the context in which we are interacting with the animal. For 
example, a pet mouse can receive substantial protection from cruel treatment. If 
that same mouse is a biomedical test subject, however, it will receive no legal 
protection whatsoever under state or federal law.  
In practice, this dichotomy between the “haves” and the “have nots” is so 
stark that any underlying philosophy seeking to reduce suffering or protect the 
human soul from corruption becomes meaningless. We tend to apply our lofty 
ideals through legislative action only when convenient and only when they do not 
interfere with our economic advantage or property rights dogma. Nowhere do we 
see this dichotomy in such stark relief as when we compare the legal treatment of 
companion animals and farmed animals. For example, if beating a dog corrupts the 
human soul, why would beating a cow not have a similar corrupting effect? And if 
it does, then why don’t we similarly legislate against that activity? Is there 
something that makes farm animals inherently different from companion animals? 
Does a “pet” pig have any less feeling than one raised for human consumption? 
Again, if not, then why do they receive such different treatment under the law? 
To use a real life example, under federal law, a veterinarian in the U.S. can 
lose her license for simply failing to provide a cat or dog with properly ventilated 
housing and clean bedding.17 Farmers, on the other hand, can confine a pregnant 
pig in a crate so small that she is unable to move, leave her there for her entire 
four-month pregnancy, and then return her to the crate as soon as she is 
impregnated again. They can force a cow to spend its entire life indoors, depriving 
him or her of any opportunity for fresh air, grazing, or exercise. They can slice off 
the majority of a chicken’s beak, without anesthesia, to keep her from pecking 
other chickens when confined in overcrowded cages. This is because, in spite of 
the United States’ extensive state-level animal welfare and anti-cruelty laws, the 
large majority of these laws specifically exclude farm animals and agricultural 
practices from their protection. 
                                            
17 9 C.F.R. Part 3. 
In fact, there are only two points in a farm animal’s life when they receive 
any protection under federal law: when they go to slaughter, and when they are 
being transported long distances. Yet even these laws only apply to certain 
animals. Chickens, which account for ninety-five percent of all animals raised for 
human consumption, receive no federal protection at any point in their life. They 
can be transported to slaughter in extreme temperatures with no food, water or 
shelter, where they are then hung upside-down in shackles, run down a conveyor 
belt to have their throats cut and be dumped—sometimes while still conscious—
into a tank of scalding water.  
While there is no federal law that protects farm animals of any kind from 
abuse and suffering while living on the farm, the regulatory treatment of farm 
animals appears to be slowly improving at the state level. In recent years, a few 
states have established legally enforceable minimum standards for confining 
animals, while others have established criminal or civil penalties for livestock 
abuse or neglect. A handful of states have adopted both types of regulations. 
California, the largest agricultural state in the U.S., recently passed the most 
extensive law in the U.S. governing the confinement of farm animals. Starting in 
2015, calves raised for veal, egg-laying hens and pregnant pigs must all have room 
and the ability to turn around in their cages, stretch their legs (or wings), stand up, 
and lie down. If fully implemented and enforced, the law could affect the lives of 
20 million animals who spend more than half of their day—and often their entire 
day—confined in cages or crates. A handful of other states have similarly outlawed 
the use of gestation crates for pregnant pigs,18 and two states19 have outlawed the 
use of gestation crates for veal, but so far California is the only state to extend that 
protection to egg-laying hens. 
State laws establishing civil and criminal penalties for the cruel treatment of 
livestock are even more varied, and most still provide some type of exception for 
agricultural practices. The state of Iowa, for example, makes it a criminal offense 
to abuse20 or neglect21 livestock. The more severe abuse provision, however, 
applies only to non-owners. In other words, it is crime to go onto someone else’s 
property and intentionally kill or injure their livestock, but legal to do so if the 
animal belongs to you, or if you are acting with the owner’s permission. In the 
state of Texas, it is a criminal offense for either a non-owner or an owner to 
torture, neglect or abandon livestock, but the law does not extend to generally 
accepted agricultural practices.22 This means that such practices as de-beaking 
chickens and branding, castrating and tail-docking cattle are all perfectly legal, 
regardless of the pain that these practices cause to the animal. In fact, most states 
that extend anti-cruelty laws to livestock include a similar exemption for common 
                                            
18 Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Maine, Oregon. 
19 Arizona, Colorado. 
20 Iowa Code § 717.1A (Livestock abuse). 
21 Iowa Code § 717.2 (Livestock neglect). 
22 Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 42.09(a)(1, 5-8) (Cruelty to livestock animals). 
or standard agricultural practices,23 even when the language of the statute suggests 
a clear concern for the welfare of farm animals. In the state of Louisiana, for 
instance, any treatment of livestock during standard transportation and processing 
of agricultural products cannot be a criminal offense.24 The same statute, however, 
specifically provides that when a person intentionally abuses or tampers with more 
than one head of livestock, each act is a separate offense.25 If Louisiana was to 
remove its exemption for standard agricultural practices, this could have 
tremendous consequences for the owners and operators of factory farms. Of 
course, that is not the case, and the exemption is still alive and well. 
There are signs, however, that this could change. In a landmark decision, the 
Supreme Court for the state of New Jersey recently rejected the notion that the 
cruel and inhumane treatment of farm animals is acceptable simply because it is 
part of routine husbandry practices and conducted by “knowledgeable” individuals 
in a way that minimizes pain.26 The court also specifically rejected the state 
department of agriculture’s authorization of tail docking as a humane practice, 
noting that it could not uphold such an inhumane practice when there is no 
conclusive evidence that it provides any benefit to the animal or to the agricultural 
operation, and when the state permits it to be performed with no particular 
                                            
23 Miss. Code Ann. § 97-41-15 (Malicious or mischievous injury to livestock; penalty; restitution); Idaho 
Code Ann. § 25-3518 (Beating and harassing animals). 
24 La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:102.1 (Cruelty to animals; simple and aggravated). 
25 Id. § 14:102.1(B)(5). 
26 New Jersey Soc. for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. New Jersey Dept. of Agriculture, 196 N.J. 366 
(2008) 
safeguards or standards. To date, New Jersey is the only state to reach such a 
conclusion, but hopefully other courts and state agencies will begin to follow their 
lead. 
The state of Maine has taken a slightly different approach to livestock cruelty. 
Rather than exempting farm animals from its anti-cruelty laws, it allows the owner 
to assert an affirmative defense if the animal is kept as part of an agricultural 
operation (and in compliance with best management practices for animal 
husbandry).27 This is important because it allows lawsuits to enter the court system 
and shifts the burden of proof to the agricultural operation. The state of Oregon 
also allows for the criminal prosecution of livestock abuse, including commercially 
grown poultry and other animals subject to “good” animal husbandry. The 
plaintiff, however, has the burden of demonstrating that the abuser acted with gross 
negligence.28 
Other states have begun to establish laws for reporting livestock abuse and 
confiscating abused animals. The state of Arizona, for instance, requires that 
veterinarians report any suspected livestock abuse to the proper authority, and 
protects them from civil liability as long as they report their suspicions in good 
faith.29 In Virginia and New Mexico, state officials can seize agricultural animals 
                                            
27 Maine Rev. Stat. tit.7, § 4011(2)(D) (Cruelty to animals). 
28 Or. Rev. Stat. § 167.335 (Exemption from [animal cruelty provisions]) 
29 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 32-2239 (Duty of veterinarian to report suspected dog participant of dog fight or 
animal abuse; immunity). 
without owner permission if a court finds that the animal has been abandoned or 
cruelly treated, or if the owner has a history of convictions for abandoning or 
cruelly treating agricultural animals.30 In Virginia, a court can consider the owner’s 
mental and physical condition in determining whether to impound an abused or 
abandoned farm animal, and can even remove all other agricultural animals in their 
possession.31  
Each of these regulations goes beyond the scope of federal law; however, in 
each case, farm animals are still treated differently than other animals. They are 
provided fewer protections and—where those protections do exist—the successful 
prosecution and enforcement of abuse and neglect can be extremely difficult.  
The enforcement of animal cruelty laws in the United States is a major hurdle 
for all types of animals, but the problem is especially severe in the case of farm 
animals. Some enforcement problems stem from the laws themselves. The federal 
Animal Welfare Act, for instance, even if it did cover farm animals, does not have 
a citizen suit provision that would allow private citizens and organizations to file 
lawsuits on behalf of the abused animals. And, violations of state anti-cruelty laws, 
even where they do cover farm animals, must be pursued by a state prosecutor. 
Unfortunately, in the grand scheme of things, especially when faced with limited 
budgets, the prosecution of abuses against people nearly always takes precedent 
                                            
30 Va. Code Ann. § 3.2-6569 (Seizure and impoundment of animals; …); N.M. Stat. § 77-18-2 (Seizure and 
disposition of cruelly treated livestock). 
31 Id. § 3.2-6569(H) 
over abuses against animals, and lawsuits against farmers (although we must now 
use this term very loosely) are an especially low priority. In the limited cases 
where the state does pursue a lawsuit aimed at protecting the welfare of farm 
animals, the standards for prosecution—that the abuse was malicious, intentional, 
and not associated with commonly accepted farming practices—can be nearly 
impossible to prove.  
Even more pervasive than the regulatory obstacles, however, is a lack of 
public support and pressure for the protection of farm animals. Historically, 
Americans have viewed farmers as “protectors” of the land and animals. And to a 
large extent this was true, because the farmer’s livelihood—and the livelihood of 
his family—depended on his ability to sustain his land and keep his livestock 
healthy. There was no reason to label products as “free range,” because that was all 
that existed. In such an environment, Americans felt that it was not only 
unnecessary to regulate farmers, but that such regulation would be contrary to our 
agrarian philosophy—the idea that working the land and raising food was the most 
honorable profession, one that deserved extra protection under the law.  
Unfortunately, the majority of Americans still retain this utopian vision of 
farming, in spite of the fact that most of the meat produced in the U.S. (and the 
world) now comes from industrialized “factory” farms owned not by individual 
farmers but by corporations. The pure number of animals at these operations makes 
it impossible to maintain humane conditions. 
Although there are signs that courts (and the public) are becoming more 
receptive to lawsuits against agricultural operations, as demonstrated by the recent 
New Jersey Supreme Court decision, there are still substantial obstacles for anyone 
trying to fight the inhumane treatment of farm animals. At the federal level, there 
is still no legal mechanism aimed at ameliorating the suffering of farm animals 
before they enter the slaughterhouse. And while state laws are becoming stronger, 
they are also highly fragmented, allowing corporations simply to move into states 
that support their practices. The state of Maryland, for example, explicitly exempts 
“dehorning, castration, tail docking, and limit feeding” from its animal cruelty 
laws, along with any activity that “may cause unavoidable physical pain to an 
animal, including food processing” as long as the person performing the activity 
uses “the most humane method reasonably available.”32 The state of Nebraska 
went to the extent of adding commercial farming into its exemption, explicitly 
providing that the states’ anti-cruelty provisions do not apply to: “Commonly 
accepted practices of animal husbandry with respect to farm animals and 
commercial livestock operations,  . . .”33 Other states, such as Utah, simply exclude 
                                            
32 Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 10-603 (Application of [crimes relating to animals provisions]). 
33 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1013(7) (Sections; exemptions [from offenses against animals provisions]). 
agricultural animals from their definition of “animal.”34 In addition, many states 
have “right-to-farm” laws that prevent citizens from bringing nuisance or other 
complaints against agricultural operations, as long as they are located on 
designated farmland, and often prevent local jurisdictions from adopting stricter 
regulations than those enacted by the state.   
One might assume (and maybe correctly) that American law allows for the 
cruel treatment of farm animals—but not the cruel treatment of companion animals 
(or pets)—because most Americans live in urban areas and have never witnessed 
the horrible conditions on a factory farm. Most Americans interact regularly, on 
the other hand, with companion animals—be it their own, a friend’s, or the dog 
being walked down the street by a stranger. One could also assume that we treat 
them differently because Americans think cats and dogs are simply “cuter” than 
pigs and chickens.  
But neither of these assumptions explains why the federal Animal Welfare 
Act—the same law that completely exempts food animals from its coverage—does 
govern the treatment of farm animals if they are being used for research, testing, 
and experimentation, in spite of the fact that most Americans also never see the 
inside of a testing facility. They are the same animals, with the same pain sensors, 
but used a different purpose. So there must be another explanation for why 
                                            
34 Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-301(Cruelty to animals). 
Americans provide farm animals with protection in a laboratory but—in most 
cases—not on the farm. The answer to this question may simply come back to 
(widespread) public awareness, combined with enduring pressure from advocacy 
groups.  
Groups such as the Humane Society of the United States and the Animal 
Welfare Institute were founded in the 1950s for the sole purpose of combating the 
use of animals in research and experimentation. It took nearly two decades for 
Congress to pass the first piece of “real” legislation addressing the care of 
laboratory animals.35 It took another 15 years—and an extensive public awareness 
campaign—to pass the federal animal testing legislation as we generally know it 
today. In comparison, efforts to combat the cruel treatment of farm animals on the 
farm (as opposed to in the lab) are relatively new. One other important difference 
is that—as noted previously—many Americans still have an idealistic view of 
farming, one that may contribute to their sense of identity as an American and, as 
such, be difficult for them to give up. Americans have never had, on the other 
hand, an idealistic view of how animals are treated in laboratories.  
Nonetheless, Americans have generally demonstrated a low tolerance for the 
cruel treatment of animals, and it seems reasonable to believe that an erosion of 
this romanticized view of farming—as more people become aware of the 
                                            
35 AWI was established in 1951 (http://www.awionline.org/ht/d/sp/i/208/pid/208); HSUS was established in 
1954 (http://www.hsus.org/about_us/); Congress amended the Laboratory Animal Welfare Act to include care of 
animals in research institutions (and not just handling of animals by dealers) in 1970. 
inherently cruel treatment of animals on factory farms—could generate sufficient 
pressure for a national reform of our farm animal cruelty laws. Whether we can 
accomplish this goal while still taking into account all  other legitimate competing 
interests, such as economic, philosophic, legal and societal concerns, remains an 
open question.  Only time will tell if farm animals (or laboratory animals) will ever 
receive the same level of legal protection, for the same philosophical reasons, as 
our companion animals.  
 
